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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, A Utah Corporation, 
PUiintif f-A ppeUant, 
vs. 
INLAND PRINTING COMP ANY, 
A Utah Corporation; D. KEITH 
BARNES; WENDELL BARNES; 
H. J. BARNES, Et Als., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
12255 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BARNESES 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a mortgage foreclosure action against a cor-
porate entity in which Plaintiff-Appellant also seeks to 
recover a deficiency judgment against Directors of the 
1 
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Company on the grounds of their alleged negligent man-
agement of the corporate affairs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-Appellant's original Complaint was filed 
on April 15, 1968, and named only Inland Printing 
Company as Defendant in a mortgage foreclosure ac-
tion. 
On March 10, 1970, Plaintiff-Appellant filed an 
Amended Complaint naming Defendants with conflict-
ing lien priorities, officers and Respondent Barnes' as 
Directors along with other Directors as Defendants. On 
or about March 27, 1970 these Respondents filed a mo-
tion to dismiss Complaint moving the Court to: (I) dis-
miss the action because the Complaint fails to state a 
claim against said Defendants upon which relief can be 
granted; and, ( 2) dismiss the action against said De-
fendants upon the ground that they had been improp-
erly .. joined as parties Defendant. An order grant-
ing Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss was signed on May 
28, 1970, which order provided that Plaintiff would 
have Twenty (20) days from May 25, 1970 in which 
to file another Amended Complaint. Plaintiff-Appel· 
lant did file a second Amended Complaint dated June 
10, 1970, and these Respondents again filed a motion to 
dismis the Second Amended Complaint which motion 
was dated July 23, 1970 and based upon the same 
grounds as set forth in the first motion to dismiss. 
2 
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The Court heard oral arguments again on August 
18, 1970, and signed an order of dismissal on August 24, 
1970 without provision for filing another amended Com-
plaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These Respondents seek an aff irmance of the Dis-
trict Court's order of dismissal dated August 24, 1970. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During November, 1961, Defendant Inland Print-
ing Company, a Utah Corporation, executed and de-
livered to Plaintiff certain promissory notes secured by 
chattel and real property mortgages. These documents 
were executed by Lloyd E. Anderson as "President and 
Manager of the Corporation." 
None of these documents was signed by any of the 
Respondents nor do their names appear anywhere there-
on nor did they make, execute or deliver any collateral 
or associated documents in connection therewith. 
On April 15, 1968 Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Com-
plaint naming only Inland Printing Company, a Utah 
Corporation, as Defendant which Complaint was in all 
3 
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respects strictly a mortgage foreclosure action. The 
default of Inland Printing Company was entered on 
May 2, 1968. 
. Plaintiff-Appellant's original Attorney evidentiy 
withdrew and new Counsel entered his appearance 011 
M.arch 6, 1970, and moved the Court for an order settilig 
aside the default of Defendant Inland Printing Com-
pany which order was granted. 
That motion stated that it was " ... a foreclosure ac-
tion against real and chattel property and that it is nec-
essary that other parties be named in this action so that 
all necessary parties can be given notice of this action . 
. . . "The Order granting the Motion stated that Plain-
tiff had leave to file an Amended Complaint" ... naming 
therein all necessary parties .... " 
Plaintiff-Appellant filed its Amended Complaint 
on March 10, 1970 which named defendants with con-
flicting lien priorities and also named Defendants-Re-
spondents as new Defendants and claimed as damages 
against them the amount of the deficiency judgment, if 
any, on the foreclosure action and based such claim upon 
their alleged "negligent" management of the corporate 
affairs. 
These Defendants-Respondents filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Complaint dated March 27, 1970 moving the 
Court: " ( 1 ) to dismiss the action because the Compla~nt 
fails to state a claim against said Defendants upon which 
relief can be granted; and, ( 2) to dismiss the action 
4 
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against said Defendants upon the ground that they have 
ueen improperly enjoined as parties-Defendant." This 
Motion to Dismiss was granted and an Order entered 
on May 28, 1970 which provided that Plaintiff-Appel-
lant would have Twenty (20) days in which to file an-
other Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiff-Appellant filed its Second Amended 
Complaint on or about June IO, 1970 and Respondents-
Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss which was 
based upon the same grounds and dated July 23, 1970. 
The Court again heard oral arguments on the mo-
tion and granted said motion in favor of Respondents-
Def endants and entered an Order to that effect dated 
August 24, 1970. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DIS-
MISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
Appellant has spent the better part of its entire 
brief with argument and citations of authority in sup-
port of legal axioms and principles whch have ne~er 
been dsputed by Respondents and which are not d1s-
5 
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puted now. Respondents fully agree that when a t' 
d . . mo 10n to ism1ss a Complaint for "failure to state a claun· 
h. . upon w ich rehef can be ~r~nted" under Rule 12 ( b) ( 6) of 
the Utah Rules of C1v1l Procedure is filed, the material 
allegations of the Complaint are to be taken as admitted· 
however, conclusions of law and unwarranted deduction; 
of fact are not admitted, Rasmussen vs. Sevier Valley 
Canal Company, 40 U. 371, 121 P. 7 41; Gunnison Irr. 
Co. vs. Peterson 74 U. 460, 280 P. 715; Hurst vs. High-
way Department, 16 U. 2d 153, 397 P. 2d 71; Cessna Fi-
nance Corp. vs. Mesilla Valley Flying Service, Inc., 81 
N.M. 10, 462 P. 2d 144; 2A Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 12.08. 
We are in agreement with the proposition that un-
der the notice theory of pleading, the Complaint must 
only give the opposing party fair notice of the nature 
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indica-
tion of the type of litigation involved. Respondents do 
not claim that they did not have adequate notice and 
knowledge of the nature of Appellant's claim as pleaded 
in its First Amended Complaint and Second Amended 
Complaint. Appellant fails to realize that we are not 
concerned with the question of whether or not the plead-
ings afforded adequate notice of the nature of the claim. 
The contention of Respondents, with which the lower 
Court agreed in granting two separate Motions to Dis· 
miss, is that under the law of the State of Utah as ap· 
plied to the facts pleaded the Appellant has not made 
out a claim for which any relief can be granted. 
6 
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In essence, Appellant has alleged that as a secured 
creditor of the corporate entity it is entitled to recover 
deficiency judgment on a mortgage foreclosure against 
corporate directors for their negligent management of 
the corporation. 
It is the position and contention of Respondents 
that corporate creditors cannot recover from directors of 
the corporation any indebtedness incurred as a corporate 
obligation on the grounds that such directors were negli-
gent in managing the affairs of the corporate debtor. 
Appellant attempts to controvert this position by 
citing two cases, neither of which is in point. The facts in 
each are totally dissimilar to the case at bar. 
In Hoggan~ Hall~ Higgins, Inc. vs. Hall, 18 U. 
2d. 3, 414 P. 2d. 89, cited by Appellant, this Court was 
dealing with a situation wherein a corporate Plaintiff 
brought suit against two former officers and stockhold-
ers who resigned and formed their own advertising 
agency, upon the ground that they had tortuously vio-
lated their duty as officers and stockholders by soliciting 
business for their planned advertising agency from 
Plaintiff's customers while they were still officers and 
stockholders of the Plaintiff corporation. Clearly, a suit 
by a corporate entity against former officers and stock-
holders is cliff erent both in law and in fact from the case 
at bar. 
In Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 U. 2d ll3, 
417 P. 2d 126, this Court was again dealing with a fac-
tual situation not relevant to the issues at bar. The situ-
7 
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ation in that case was that Plaintiff and Defendant h d 
f"d · a a 
I uciary relationship in which they jointly contracted 
for the development of some real estate in southeast Salt 
La~e County. Plaintiff as beneficiary brought suit 
aga~nst Defendant for an accounting. The rule which 
Plamtiff refers to in the quote in its brief but which is 
not quoted is set forth as follows, and is found at Page 
129 Vol. 417 of the Pacific Reporter, Second Series: 
. "We do not question the rule that when a fidu-
ciary .deals for his own interest with the benefici-
ary, m case any question arises, such dealings 
should be scrutinized with great care, and the 
burden is upon him to show good faith in the 
transaction. This rule applies in favor of the stock-
holders of a corporation as against its officers, 
but it does not ordinarily extend to a creditor." 
(I tali cs added.) 
The Court went on to find that the trial Court was 
justified in refusing to accept the Plaintiff's contention 
of fiduciary responsibility to him and was, therefore, 
correct in applying " ... the general rue that the burden 
of proving fraud was upon the Plaintiff who asserted it." 
It is, therefore, clearly evident that the Court would 
apply the rule referred to above on behalf of creditors 
only when there was proof of a fiduciary responsibility 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and that it 
would not do so otherwise. It may be argued inferenti· 
ally that the Court in effect said that in the absence of a 
fiduciary relationship between the creditor and the cor· 
porate directors, the creditor must allege and carry the 
burden of proving fraud against directors in order to re· 
cover against them for corporate liabilities. 
8 
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In any event, it is clear that there is no fiduciary re-
lationship between directors of a corporate moragagor 
and a mortgagee debtor unless such directors agree to be 
bound personally on the mortgage documents which they 
did not do in this case. Respondents have found no au-
thorities to support a proposition to the contrary and 
Appellant, which has the burden of doing so, has cited 
none. 
Appellant has cited 19 AmJur 2d, Corporations§§ 
1276, 1336, both of which deal with the right of the cor-
porate entity to bring action against its officers and di-
rectors, neither of which is applicable to the present sit-
uation. 19 AmJur 2d, Corporations§ 1341 cited by Ap-
pellant under a sub-chapter entitled "L. Rights and Li-
abilities as to Creditors or Third Persons I. Liabilities 
for Corporate Acts, Debts or Contracts," states generally 
in part: 
"In most instances the directors or officers of a 
corporation are not liable to its creditors or third 
persons for corporate acts or debts. The directors 
or officers of a corporation are not liable for cor-
porate acts and debts simply by reason of their 
official relation to the corporation; they are mere-
ly the agents of the corporation and on principal, 
should no more be held liable therefor than any 
other agent should be held liable for the acts and 
debts of his principal." 
* * * * 
The law in support of Respondents' position is well 
stated in 19 AmJur 2d, Corporations§ 1350 under a sub-
chapter entitled "Liability for Mismanagement, Waste 
or Diversion of Assets" as follows: 
9 
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"D~ectors or officers may be liable to the cor-
poratw:i or stockholders for mismanagement of 
the busmess of ~he corporation or waste of its as-
sets; ~mt accor.dmg to .a number of cases, they arc 
not liable to its creditors for mere mismanage-
ment or waste of assets constituting a wrong or 
breach of duty as to the corporation. The rule gen-
erally followed by the authorities is that a credi-
tor .of a corporati?n may not maintain a personal 
action at. law against the officers or directors of a 
corporation who have, by their mismanagement 
or negligence, committed a wrong against the cor-
poration to the consequent damage of the credi-
tor. The reason given for the rule is the entire 
lack of privity between the parties. There is cer-
tainly no contractual relation between them, nor 
any other legal relation which would raise a dutv, 
on the part of directors or officers, to the credit;r 
to exercise care in the management of the affairs 
of the corporation. The duty to exercise diligence 
and care is one owed to the corporation, and it is 
elementary law that one person cannot maintain 
an action against another for a wrong to a third 
person which injures him only incidentally. How-
ever, there are other cases which seem to hold an 
opinion contrary to the general proposition as ~x­
pressed above. These actions seem to be mam-
tained upon the theory that directors are trustees 
for creditors, but generally these cases have so1'.1c 
element of fraud and deceit involved therem 
Statutory provisions may permit actions by cre~1-
tors against corporate officers in the cas~ of nm: 
management, ~n? in a J?roper case, a creditor 1~a;. 
maintain a smt m eqmty. Of course, a credit~ 
may have an action at law for fraud and deceit) 
but such an action is based upon a wrong persona 
to the creditor, and not a wrong consequent u~on 
the breach of the duty owing to the corporatwn 
10 
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to manage its affairs and asseJs properly. (Italics 
added.] 
That was a statement of what Respondents have 
contended all along, namely, that in the absence of any 
allegations of fraud and deceit, creditors cannot main-
tain an action against corporate directors for their mis-
management of corporate affairs. That was the primary 
basis of Respondents' first Motion to Dismiss and even 
though Appellant's Second Amended Complaint was 
substantially more prolix than the first, it was again un-
willing or unable to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted and the Second Amended Complaint was also 
dismissed. 
An annotation entitled "Ribht of Creditor of Cor-
poration to Maintain Personal Action Against Directors 
or Officers for Mismanagement" found at 50 ALR 4.62 
asks the question: 
''Assuming such negligence or other breach of 
duty on the part of the directors as would render 
them personally liable at the suit of the corpora-
tion or anyone suing in its right, may a creditor 
maintain a suit against them, not in the right of 
the corporation, but in his own right, on the 
theory that the ultimate consequence was a loss 
t h. 2" o rm. 
After stating that cases dealing with claimants who 
were fraudulently or deceitfully induced by directors to 
extend credit to the corporation were not included in the 
annotation, the question is answered as follows: 
"'Vhile there is some confusion on the subject, 
it may be stated, with some assurance, that a cred-
11 
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ito~ of a corporati?n may not maintain a personal 
action, a~ law, agamst the officers or directors of a 
corpor~tion, who ha:e, by their mismanagemenl 
or negligence, committed a wrong against the cor. 
poration to the consequent damage of the credi-
tor." (Citing cases.) 
It has been held that the directors of a corporation 
are responsible to the corporation, and not to its creditors 
for breaches of duty in discharging their functions a~ 
corporate directors. Pritchard vs. Myers, 174 Md. 66, 
197 A. 620, 116 ALR 775. 
In the case of Inter-Ocean Casualty Company vs. 
Leccony Smokeless Fuel Company, 123 W. Va. 541, 17 
SE 2d 51, 137 ALR 488 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court said: 
"Moreover, the record here does not disclose 
any active misfeasance on the part of Moran and 
Jarett as officers and directors of the coal com· 
pany. Certainly they received no benefit from the 
failure of their corporation to account for and 
pay over the amount of the premiums to the in· 
surance company. In this state it is well settled 
that the creditor of a monied corporation cannot 
maintain an action at law against the directori 
thereof for simply nonf easance of duty to tI:e cor· 
poration or fraud in its management or m1sman· 
agement in the disposition of the money or pr~p· 
erty of the corporation in the absenc~ of a~ actii;c 
intent to deceive or defraud the Plaintiff. [lta · 
ics added.) 
* * * * 
In Wesley Corporation vs. Blackburn, 107 ~V. 
Va. 519, 149 SE 22, the Court said: 'The evasion 
12 
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?f personal liability is~ co~on motive prompt-
mg person~ to engage m busmess through the in-
strumentality of a corporation.' And, by the same 
token and reasoning, neither are the directors nor 
officers liable in the absence of active wrongdo-
ing." [Italics added.] 
It has been stated that officers and directors of a 
corporation are not liable to the corporate creditors, in 
the absence of fraud, for negligence or mismanagement 
of the company's business resulting in insolvency, unless 
made so by charter or statute, neither of which is in-
volved in the case at bar. United States Fidelity~ Guar-
anty Company vs. Corning State Saving Bank, 154 Iowa 
588, 134 NW 857. 
The position of Respondents is further supported in 
3 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (perm. ed.)§ 1193 "Liability for 
Debts in General" where it is stated: 
"The directors or other officers of a corpora-
tion are not liable for debts contracted in t~.name 
and on behalf of the corporation and ar~hicfi 
binding upon it, unless they are expressly ma~e 
liable by statute or unless they contract on their 
own behalf. This is true notwithstanding the cor-
poration is insolvent.'' (Citing cases.) 
* * * * 
The Order of dismissal should be affirmed for the 
further reason that Appellant's action was a foreclosure 
action and that these Respondents were not "necessary 
parties" within the meaning of the Order of the Court 
dated March 6 1970 allowing Appellant to add other 
' 
13 
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parties Defendant who had conflicting lien interests for 
the purpose of resolving lien priorities. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of dismissal entered by the Court below 
should be affirmed on the grounds that: ( 1) Appellant's 
Second Amended Complaint failed to state a claim 
against Respondents upon which relief could be granted; 
and, (2) Respondents were not properly joined as De· 
fendants in the action. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
KING & KING 
By: FELSHAW KING, Esquire 
Attorneys for Defendants-Responden~ 
251 East 200 South 
P. 0. Box 220 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Telephone: 825-2202 
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